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COURTS HAVE GONE OVERBOARD IN 
APPLYING THE MARITIME DRUG LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ACT 
Elaina Aquila* 
 
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), enacted through 
Congress’s power to “define and punish . . . Felonies Committed on the high 
Seas,” prosecutes individuals for drug trafficking “on board” vessels.  
Individuals often raise jurisdictional defenses in U.S. courts when prosecuted 
under MDLEA, and scholarship in the area argues about whether the 
Constitution permits MDLEA to reach drug traffickers who are on the high 
seas.  Recently, courts have begun using MDLEA to prosecute foreign 
nationals located in a foreign nation who are not on board a vessel as 
conspirators.  However, no court has fully examined Congress’s authority to 
enact a statute with this reach or engaged in a comprehensive statutory 
interpretation of MDLEA’s conspiracy provision. 
This Note examines MDLEA from two perspectives.  First, it examines 
whether Congress has constitutional authority to enact a law prosecuting 
drug trafficking by a foreign national on land in a foreign nation to determine 
the validity of such law.  Because the Constitution grants Congress the power 
to punish crimes on the high seas, this inquiry depends on whether 
conspiracy can effectively extend an individual’s conduct from land to the 
high seas.  Second, this Note considers the statutory language of MDLEA to 
determine whether the law enables the prosecution of a foreign national 
located in a foreign nation as a conspirator. 
This Note argues that the text of the statute limits the substantive offense 
by using the jurisdictional language of “on board a covered vessel,” and so 
MDLEA remains a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I authority under the 
Felonies Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Colombian drug trafficker at home in Colombia conspires to transport 
cocaine from Colombia to Australia.  The boat sets sail for Australia but is 
stopped, and the drugs are seized.  The drug trafficker, who was in Colombia 
the entire time, is now sitting in a New York federal prison.  That individual 
would probably ask, “How did I wind up here?”  It is not surprising that he 
is in prison but rather that he is in the United States.  This is exactly what 
Daniel German Sanchez Alarcon must be wondering. 
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On July 5, 2017, the Southern District of New York denied Defendant 
Sanchez’s motion to dismiss charges against him under the Maritime Drug 
Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for lack of jurisdiction.1  MDLEA states 
that “[w]hile on board a covered vessel, an individual may not knowingly or 
intentionally . . . manufacture or distribute, or possess with intent to 
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”2  Sanchez argued that 
MDLEA did not apply to him because he was not a U.S. citizen, was never 
on board the vessel or “on the high seas,” let alone in the United States, and 
his conduct never targeted the United States.3  He further argued that, while 
MDLEA covers conspiracies, the relevant provision does not confer 
jurisdiction.4  The court held that interpreting MDLEA’s conspiracy 
provision to reach only individuals on board a vessel would undermine the 
intent of Congress.5  The court also stated that, as long as an individual 
understood that his or her conduct could be prosecuted, it is irrelevant 
whether that individual was aware that he or she could be prosecuted in the 
United States.6 
Applying MDLEA to reach a foreign national in a foreign country raises 
constitutional issues.  Scholars argue about whether it is constitutional for 
MDLEA to reach individuals on the high seas,7 and one scholar has expressed 
the need for a limit on the Felonies Clause.8 
A broad reading of MDLEA also raises budgetary concerns.  The United 
States spends over $8 million annually battling marine drug trafficking,9 and 
“[h]undreds if not thousands” of foreign nationals sit in United States federal 
prisons for violating MDLEA.10  The average cost of incarcerating one 
 
 1. United States v. Aragon, No. 15-292, 2017 WL 2889499 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017).  
 2. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2012). 
 3. Memorandum of Law in Support of Mr. Daniel German Sanchez Alarcon’s Pre-Trial 
Motion to Dismiss the indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Relief at 1–3, Aragon, 
2017 WL 2889499 (No. 15-292), ECF No. 167. 
 4. Id. at 21–22.   
 5. Aragon, 2017 WL 2889499, at *19 (citing United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 
145 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
 6. Id. at *18–19 (asserting that in Sanchez’s case there was no due process problem based 
on a lack of a connection to the United States). 
 7. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon:  Congress’s 
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191 
(2009) (arguing that “all or most” instances of establishing jurisdiction under MDLEA exceed 
Congress’s Article I powers); Charles R. Fritch, Note, Drug Smuggling on the High Seas:  
Using International Legal Principles to Establish Jurisdiction over the Illicit Narcotics Trade 
and the Ninth Circuit’s Unnecessary Nexus Requirement, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
701 (2009) (arguing the United States has the authority to prosecute individuals under 
MDLEA regardless of a nexus to the United States). 
 8. See Stephanie M. Chaissan, Comment, “Minimum Contacts” Abroad:  Using the 
International Shoe Test to Restrict the Extraterritorial Exercise of United States Jurisdiction 
Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 641, 650 
(2007).  Chaissan differentiates between the United States’ authority to apply a law to foreign 
nationals generally and its ability to prosecute a foreign national, who violates law outside of 
the United States, does not have contact with the United States, and whose conduct does not 
sufficiently affect the United States. Id. at 648. 
 9. Fritch, supra note 7, at 701. 
 10. Kontorovich, supra note 7, at 1195.   
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individual in a federal prison is $31,977.65 a year.11  If courts continue to 
construe MDLEA broadly, the amount of tax revenue spent on housing 
foreign nationals in U.S. federal prisons will increase. 
This Note argues that the text of the statute limits the substantive offense 
by using the jurisdictional language of “on board a covered vessel.”  As a 
result, MDLEA remains a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I authority, 
which in this instance is limited to the high seas.  Part I of this Note describes 
the jurisdictional authority of the U.S. government to prosecute a foreign 
national in a foreign country.  This Part lays out the differences between 
adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction and draws on the Constitution, the 
substantive offense of MDLEA, and international law principles of criminal 
jurisdiction to help determine whether the United States can prosecute these 
individuals. 
Part II then analyzes the current application of this issue in U.S. courts and 
identifies the shortcomings of the courts in interpreting MDLEA.  
Specifically, this Part discusses how courts have not engaged in a full 
statutory interpretation, and instead have inadequately relied on precedent 
and improperly generalized the intent of Congress. 
Part III argues that prosecuting a foreign national located in a foreign 
country as a conspirator exceeds Congress’s Article I powers and raises due 
process concerns.  Because courts have not fully addressed this issue, this 
Part seeks to lay out the inquiry courts should engage in to determine the 
constitutionality of this application.  This Part shows that the Felonies Clause 
limits Congress’s power to enact laws that prosecute individuals on the high 
seas and that MDLEA contains jurisdictional language that limits the offense 
to individuals who are “on board” a vessel to avoid constitutional concerns. 
Part IV addresses practical considerations and suggests that courts should 
stop applying MDLEA to reach foreign nationals located in foreign nations 
as conspirators.  This Note also urges legislators to amend the statute to 
clarify that the conspiracy provision only applies to individuals “on board a 
covered vessel.” 
I.  TWO TYPES OF JURISDICTION DETERMINE WHETHER PROSECUTING 
A LAND-BASED CONSPIRATOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
If a state does not have jurisdiction over an individual, the state cannot 
enforce its laws over that individual.12  In assessing the constitutionality of 
MDLEA, two concerns arise:  prescriptive jurisdiction, which is a state’s 
authority to enforce its laws against an individual,13 and adjudicative 
jurisdiction, which is a state’s authority to impose its legal process on an 
 
 11. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,957, 46,957 
(July 19, 2016).  
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(b) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).  
 13. Id. § 521; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction:  Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 121, 126 (2007). 
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individual.14  A prescriptive jurisdictional inquiry considers whether 
Congress exercised appropriate lawmaking authority and whether a court 
may exercise subject matter jurisdiction,15 whereas an adjudicative 
jurisdictional inquiry raises questions regarding personal jurisdiction and 
whether the substantive offense covers the behavior.16  Technically, 
adjudicative jurisdiction cannot exist without prescriptive jurisdiction; a law 
that does not confer prescriptive jurisdiction would be unconstitutional and 
thus unenforceable.17  A substantive law can be within prescriptive limits and 
be constitutional, however, a court can declare it unconstitutional as applied 
in a given situation.18 
Simply put, this situation raises two similar, but distinct, questions.  First, 
does Congress have the authority under Article I, Section 8, clause 10 of the 
U.S. Constitution19 (the “Define and Punish Clause”) to enact a law that 
allows the United States to prosecute a foreign national in a foreign nation 
for trafficking drugs on the high seas?20  Second, does the substantive offense 
of MDLEA prohibit a foreign national not “on board” a vessel, but rather 
located in a foreign nation, from conspiring to traffic drugs?21 
Part I.A lays out the scope of authority granted to Congress by the 
Constitution, which determines whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists.  Part 
I.B.1 discusses the rights of foreign nationals to raise adjudicative jurisdiction 
defenses.  Then, Part I.B.2 provides background on the substantive offense 
of MDLEA, which determines whether adjudicative jurisdiction exists.  
Finally, Part I.C expands the discussion by drawing on prevailing theories of 
criminal jurisdiction in international law to assess whether principles of 
international law can establish jurisdiction. 
 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(b); 
Colangelo, supra note 13, at 126.  
 15. Colangelo, supra note 13, at 126.  
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(b); 
Colangelo, supra note 13, at 126. 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down a 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act because Congress did not have the authority to 
regulate noneconomic activity, which traditionally has been dealt with by the state, under the 
Commerce Clause). 
 18. See generally Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2010) (differentiating between holding a statute facially 
unconstitutional and “overturn[ing] the application of [a] statute”).  
 19. See United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(analyzing the constitutionality of MDLEA as applied by interpreting Article I, Section 8, 
clause 10); Chaissan, supra note 8, at 649 (“MDLEA seemingly stems from the Piracies and 
Felonies Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
 20. See Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and 
the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 289, 303 (2012) (describing prescriptive 
jurisdiction as whether Congress has the ability to enact a law).  
 21. Id. (describing adjudicative jurisdiction as whether a court can hear a case based on 
laws currently in place).  
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A.  Prescriptive Jurisdiction:  The Limits on Congress’s Authority to 
“Define and Punish . . . Felonies Committed on the High Seas” 
Understanding Congress’s constitutional authority to enact MDLEA is 
crucial in analyzing whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists to prosecute a 
foreign national located in a foreign country as a conspirator under MDLEA. 
In enacting MDLEA, Congress relied upon the Define and Punish 
Clause,22 which grants Congress the power “to define and punish Piracies 
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations.”23  There are two terms that must be defined to understand the 
Define and Punish Clause:  “Piracies,” which the U.S. Supreme Court defined 
as “robbery upon the sea,”24 and “Offences against the Law of Nations,” 
which another court limited by “customary international law.”25  Further, 
“[d]rug trafficking was not a violation of customary international law at the 
time of the Founding, and drug trafficking is not a violation of customary 
international law today.”26  Therefore, Congress used the power to “define 
and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high Seas”27 (the “Felonies 
Clause”) to enact MDLEA. 
Understanding the scope of Congress’s lawmaking authority helps 
determine whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists.  The Eleventh Circuit has 
noted that “the Felonies Clause is textually limited to conduct on the high 
seas.”28  Two terms must be defined to properly interpret this Clause.  The 
“high seas” means “[t]he ocean waters beyond the jurisdiction of any 
country,”29 and a “felony” is a “serious crime” punishable by a prison 
sentence of longer than one year or by death.30  Whether Congress interpreted 
and applied the Felonies Clause properly when it enacted MDLEA 
determines whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists. 
The founders gave police power to the states, not the federal government.31  
Therefore, Congress generally cannot create felonies.32  Understanding what 
motivated the founders to give Congress the authority to prosecute certain 
felonies under the Felonies Clause helps to explain the scope of Congress’s 
power.  At the time of the founding, pirates were a serious threat and seen as 
 
 22. See supra note 19.  
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 24. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).  
 25. United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 26. Id. at 1253–54.   
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 28. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1248–49 (analyzing how the Felonies Clause does not 
proscribe the ability to seize a boat located in another territory’s waters); see also Kontorovich, 
supra note 7, at 1193–95 (explaining that there is probably less scholarship on the Define and 
Punish Clause than any other Article I power and asserting that the Felonies Clause is limited 
to the high seas).  
 29. High Seas, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 30. Felony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 31. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 616, 618 (2000).  Police power is the ability to 
enact laws regarding “public security, order, health, morality, and justice.” Police Power, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 32. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1821).  
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members of the worst class of criminals.33  The ocean was considered shared 
property,34 and because pirates targeted all nations, they were considered 
adversaries of all nations.35  Therefore, the founders sought to establish the 
authority for Congress to enact legislation to prosecute them. 
There are limits on Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause.  First, 
at the time of the founding, there was an emphasis on the separation between 
state and federal governments.36  The Honorable St. George Tucker, in a 
prominent legal text,37 explained that crimes that occurred on soil are 
reserved to the states and did not implicate the Define and Punish Clause.38  
In modern times there has been a rise in federal criminal laws,39 the majority 
of which are enacted through Congress’s spending power.40 
Second, at the time of the founding, the United States was a “weak” 
country, susceptible to the will of stronger nations.41  Because of this, the 
founders were reserved in constructing foreign policy.42  To gain the respect 
of other countries, the United States had to respect and create diplomatic 
relationships.43  In modern times, however, the United States is a superpower 
on the world stage.44 
 
 33. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 171–72 (1926) (“Pirates have been 
regarded by all civilized nations as the enemies of the human race, and the most atrocious 
violators of the universal law of society.  They are every where pursued and punished with 
death; and the severity with which the law has animadverted upon this crime, arises from its 
enormity and danger, the cruelty that accompanies it.” (footnote omitted)).  See generally 
DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES (Manuel Schonhorn ed., 1724). 
 34. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
107 (2d ed. 1829) (“[T]he sea becomes the common property of all nations.”).  
 35. Id. (“[T]he pirate is the enemy of all nations, and all nations are the enemy of the 
pirate”).  All nations have the ability to prosecute pirates, felonies on the high seas, and 
offenses against the law of nations. See Nat’l Const. Ctr., Article I:  The Legislative Branch—
The Enumerated Powers (Section 8), CONST. DAILY (Feb. 21, 2014), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/article-1-the-legislative-branch-the-enumerated-powers-
sections-8 [https://perma.cc/QWC9-VAUX] (asserting that “[e]very sovereign nation 
possesses” powers analogous to those granted under Article I, Section 8, clause 10).   
 36. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 37. Davison M. Douglas, Foreword:  The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1111, 1114 & n.16 (2006) (citing Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker’s Law Papers, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1247 (2006)).  
 38. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *415 (asserting that the power to 
prosecute “[a]ll felonies and offences committed upon land . . . [is] reserved to the states, 
respectively”). 
 39. Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal 
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2003). 
 40. Id. at 6.  
 41. Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs:  Congress’s Power to “Define and 
Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 466 (2000); 
Matthew Spalding, America’s Founders and the Principles of Foreign Policy:  Sovereign 
Independence, National Interests, and the Cause of Liberty in the World, HERITAGE FOUND. 3 
(Oct. 15, 2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/fp0033.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YK59-Y7EP]. 
 42. Spalding, supra note 41, at 3–4.  
 43. Id. at 14.  
 44. Andreas Paulus, Antinomies of Power and Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW AS 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW:  A DECADE OF THE GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 313, 313 (Russell A. Miller 
ed., 2012).  
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Understanding the scope of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause 
is vital.  As James Madison explained, “[t]he powers delegated by the . . . 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.”45  And as the 
Supreme Court later held, “The Constitution’s express conferral of some 
powers makes clear that it does not grant others.  And the federal government 
‘can exercise only the powers granted to it.’”46  Therefore, there must be an 
enumerated power authorizing Congress to enact a given law.47 
Article I, Section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution (the “Necessary and 
Proper Clause”) broadens Congress’s authority.  This Clause allows 
Congress to “make all Laws [that] shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” its enumerated powers.48  It follows, therefore, that the goal 
of any law enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must still be 
within the range of Congress’s enumerated powers.49 
Therefore, Congress has the authority to enact both laws that criminalize 
felonies committed on the high seas and laws that are necessary and proper 
for achieving this end. 
B.  Adjudicative Jurisdiction:  The Substantive Offense 
of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
Knowing the extent to which MDLEA prohibits conduct helps to 
determine whether the United States has adjudicative jurisdiction to 
prosecute a foreign national, not on board a vessel, as a conspirator.  Part 
I.B.1 lays out the rights of foreign nationals to raise a defense regarding 
adjudicative jurisdiction.  Part I.B.2 discusses the scope of the substantive 
offense of MDLEA. 
1.  Rights of Foreign Nationals 
Adjudicative jurisdiction considers whether the substantive offense covers 
the conduct as well as personal jurisdiction.50  It remains unlikely that a 
criminal defendant who is a foreign national can successfully assert the 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.51  Rather, precedent suggests the 
need for a due process violation for a foreign national to claim this type of 
defense.52 
The Constitution differentiates between citizens and noncitizens in regard 
to certain rights.53  Nevertheless, the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
 
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 99 (James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009). 
 46. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (quoting 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)). 
 47. See id.  
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 49. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 50. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659–63 (1992). 
 52. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973).  
 53. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as 
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (explaining that “the right not to be 
discriminatorily denied the vote and the right to run for federal elective office are expressly 
restricted to citizens” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XV)).  
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Amendments apply to foreign nationals.54  The principles of due process and 
equal protection are rights afforded “to all ‘persons.’”55  When being 
prosecuted for a crime in the United States, an individual is “entitled to all of 
the rights that attach to the criminal process” even if he or she is a foreign 
national.56 
There is also an issue of whether an individual would have notice that 
MDLEA applies to his or her conduct.  The Fifth Amendment provides that 
“no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”57  Due process requires that a statute “give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden 
by the statute.”58  This Clause allows a court to hold a statute unconstitutional 
when judicial construction “unforeseeably and retroactively expand[s]” the 
statute.59 
Disagreement exists as to the extent to which courts should be concerned 
with possible due process problems when applying a criminal statute 
extraterritorially.60  While some propose that the Fifth Amendment should be 
applied to foreign nationals in the same way it is used domestically, others 
insist that conducting a rigid due process analysis for foreign nationals would 
reduce the United States’ impact on and power among nations.61 
Thus, for a criminal defendant who is a foreign national to be afforded any 
protection based on a lack of adjudicative jurisdiction, the foreign national 
must assert a due process violation.62 
2.  Tracking the Legislative History of MDLEA to Identify the 
Jurisdictional Scope of the Act 
Whether MDLEA confers adjudicative jurisdiction and whether a 
reasonable person could foresee that his or her conduct is prohibited hinge 
on its provisions. 
 
 54. Id. at 369 (concluding that fewer “distinctions” exist between the rights afforded to 
citizens and noncitizens than are traditionally thought and that “foreign nationals are generally 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws . . . and to due process requirements of fair 
procedure where their lives, liberty, or property are at stake”). 
 55. Id. at 370 (explaining that due process and equal protection rights apply to noncitizens 
and that the Constitution does not make a distinction between citizens and noncitizens when 
establishing these rights); see Jennifer K. Elsea, Substantive Due Process and U.S. Jurisdiction 
over Foreign Nationals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2077, 2080 (2014) (discussing the definition of 
“persons” under the Fifth Amendment as applied to aliens).  
 56. Cole, supra note 53, at 370–71 & n.16; Elsea, supra note 55, at 2089.  See generally 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (considering a foreign national’s 
Fourth Amendment rights after a search by border patrol).  
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 58. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).  
 59. Id. at 352.   
 60. See Elsea, supra note 55, at 2080–81 & n.19 (explaining that just because “all persons” 
have Fifth Amendment rights does not mean that in application these rights must be applied 
consistently without making distinctions based on citizenship and alienage). 
 61. Colangelo, supra note 13, at 124. 
 62. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
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Section 70503 provides that “[w]hile on board a covered vessel, an 
individual may not knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture or distribute, 
or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”63  
The statute does two pertinent things.  First, it prohibits attempts and 
conspiracies to violate § 70503.64  Second, it calls for extraterritorial 
application.65  This Note considers MDLEA and its history as a whole to 
understand the scope of the conspiracy provision when applied 
extraterritorially. 
Congress enacted a predecessor to MDLEA in 1980 (the “1980 Act”) to 
fill a gap in U.S. laws regarding narcotics importation.66  Those who were 
found on the high seas with drugs sometimes escaped liability where no proof 
of a conspiracy could be found.67  In other cases, a seagoing vessel would 
insulate itself by loitering outside U.S. waters and off-load the drugs onto 
smaller, faster boats that are more difficult to catch.68  It was necessary to 
implement this statute due to the difficulties in enforcing laws on the high 
seas.69 
The predecessor to MDLEA was discussed by legislators on the floor of 
the House of Representatives.  Statements on the House floor suggest that the 
statute was intended to apply extraterritorially70 and reach those drug 
traffickers who were “seaborne.”71  The bill was considered a necessary, 
“noncontroversial piece of legislation.”72 
Committee reports suggest that the scope of the bill was contemplated to 
reach individuals on the high seas.  The Subcommittee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries report explained that the Departments of Justice and 
Transportation recommended language that “reflect[ed] the extent of U.S. 
ability under international law to prescribe rules of conduct for persons in 
vessels on the high seas.”73  Further, the discussion of the conspiracy 
provision referenced persons on board a vessel but did not address land-based 
conspirators.74 
 
 63. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2012).  
 64. Id. § 70506(b). 
 65. Id. § 70503(b) (providing that “[s]ubsection (a) applies even though the act is 
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”).  
 66. See generally Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 955 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 4–6 (1979) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining 
that because of an “oversight” in 1970, a bill prohibiting the “use” of drugs on a U.S. vessel 
on the high seas was “inadvertently repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act” allowing the United States to prosecute only if “conspiracy to import” could 
be proved); Fritch, supra note 7, at 708–09. 
 67. 125 CONG. REC. 20,082–84 (1979) (statements of Rep. Biaggi and Rep. Murphy).  
 68. Id. at 20,084 (statement of Rep. LaFalce).  
 69. Id. at 20,083 (statement of Rep. McCloskey).  
 70. 126 CONG. REC. 20,737 (1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).  
 71. 125 CONG. REC. 20,084 (1979) (statement of Rep. Murphy) (asserting that “seaborne 
drug traffickers will no longer be able to escape prosecution”). 
 72. 126 CONG. REC. 20,737 (1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).  
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 9 (1979) (Conf. Rep.). 
 74. Id. at 13–14, 25 (discussing the conspiracy provision and providing as the only 
example:  “a person aboard any vessel on the high seas who knowingly transfers a large 
amount of a controlled substance to a person aboard a vessel of the United States”). 
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In 1986, Congress enacted MDLEA, finding it “necessary to ‘facilitate 
enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws relating to the importation of illegal 
drugs.’”75  MDLEA was crucial to stem a developing movement of 
defendants trying to “escape conviction” by using “international 
jurisdictional questions as legal technicalities.”76  Congress enacted MDLEA 
as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, a major piece of legislation,77 
which was “fast track[ed]” through the enactment process78 and received 
bipartisan support to create a “drug-free America.”79  The Act increased 
funding for the United States to prohibit drugs internationally, and it allocated 
funds to drug abuse education and treatment programs, which was seen as 
noteworthy.80 
The legislative history pertaining to MDLEA itself is brief.  Discussion of 
MDLEA on the House and Senate floors centered around the increased 
budget allocated to the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict drugs.81  The ability to 
interdict drugs in the territorial waters of another nation, with the consent of 
that nation, was the only substantive change noted by the legislation.82  
President Ronald Reagan’s signing statement did not even mention MDLEA 
but rather focused on changes to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).83 
The language in MDLEA mirrors the 1980 Act almost identically.  The 
1980 Act provided that 
it is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on 
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high 
seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess 
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.84 
 
 75. Fritch, supra note 7, at 709 (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1); see also Pub. L. No. 
99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
 76. Fritch, supra note 7, at 709 n.47 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 15 (1986)). 
 77. See Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Law:  Words, Deeds, Political Expediency, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/27/us/anti-drug-law-words-deeds-
political-expediency.html [https://perma.cc/6VXP-2V77] (calling the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 “the most far-reaching drug law ever passed by Congress”). 
 78. 132 CONG. REC. 33,246 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles). 
 79. Id. at 33,248 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 80. Id.   
 81. See id. at 22,651 (statement of Rep. Pepper) (discussing how the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
provides increased funds for the Coast Guard to interdict drugs); id. at 26,474 (stating that the 
Act provides $45,000,000 for purchasing radar systems for Coast Guard surveillance, 
$153,000,000 for the Coast Guard, and mandates that 500 Coast Guard personnel be assigned 
to naval vessels to interdict drugs); id. at 26,730 (asserting that $150,000,000 will be allocated 
to the Coast Guard for drug interdiction); id. at 27,174 (explaining that the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act “increases Federal support for interdiction by the . . . Coast Guard”).  
 82. See id. at 26,475 (asserting that MDLEA “creates a new offense to make it unlawful 
under U.S. law to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance aboard a vessel 
located within the territorial sea of another country where that country affirmatively consents 
to enforcement action by the U.S.”); id. at 26,719–20 (statement of Sen. Murkowski) 
(discussing that interdicting a flag vessel or a vessel in another territory’s waters requires 
permission by the foreign nation). 
 83. Presidential Statement on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1447 (Oct. 27, 1986).  
 84. See generally Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 955a (2012)). 
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MDLEA provides, “While on board a covered vessel, an individual may 
not knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture or distribute, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”85  The only 
change is that, while the 1980 Act explained jurisdiction in the substantive 
offense itself, MDLEA discusses jurisdiction in the definition of “covered 
vessel.”  MDLEA defines a covered vessel as “(1) a vessel of the United 
States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any 
other vessel if the individual is a citizen of the United States or a resident 
alien of the United States.”86  Consistent with the scope of the 1980 Act, this 
suggests that MDLEA applies to U.S. citizens and resident aliens regardless 
of the vessel they board. 
In 1996, Congress amended MDLEA to add a provision regarding 
jurisdiction.87  This provision makes clear that whether a vessel is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States is a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction.88 
It follows that MDLEA allows the United States to prosecute individuals 
for drug trafficking who are on board vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
C.  Theories of Criminal Jurisdiction 
As this application touches upon international law and foreign nations, 
some argue that theories of criminal jurisdiction could confer prescriptive 
jurisdiction.89  The five theories of criminal jurisdiction—territorial, 
protective, nationality, universal, and passive personality90—have become 
the prevailing outlook in regard to criminal jurisdiction in international law.91 
 
 85. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2012).  
 86. Id. § 70503(e)(1)–(2). 
 87. See id. § 70504(a).  
 88. United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d 1185, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. De 
La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1105 
(11th Cir. 2002) (“By adding to the MDLEA the jurisdiction and venue provision, 46 U.S.C. 
app. § 1903(f), Congress, as we have pointed out, plainly indicated that whether a vessel is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is not an element of the offense, but instead is 
solely an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that should be treated as a preliminary question 
of law for the court’s determination.”); United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 626 
(5th Cir. 2001).  But see United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating 
that the jurisdictional provision does not relate to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction but rather 
the “reach and application” of MDLEA).  See infra note 175 for how the First Circuit’s holding 
supports that MDLEA does not reach conspirators not “on board.”  
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(considering theories of international law when determining a question of jurisdiction).  
 90. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUPPLEMENT 435, 439–40 (1935).  Scholars refer to this authority as “Harvard Draft.”  
 91. THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS AND 
APPRAISAL 21–22 (John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2007) (discussing the impact and 
authority of the Harvard Draft and finding that the convention on “Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Crime” has been referenced in 263 law review articles); Christopher L. Blakesley, United 
States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1110 & 
n.5 (1982) (describing the theories put forth in the Harvard Draft and stating that the Harvard 
Draft theories have been adopted by U.S. federal courts, state courts, most course books, and 
most treatises on international law); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, A New Jurisprudential 
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When determining MDLEA cases, courts focus their analyses on the 
protective and universal theories of criminal jurisdiction.92  The protective 
theory grants jurisdiction over a criminal when her conduct affects or intends 
to affect a national interest of the forum state.93  The effect must “pose a 
threat to national security, sovereignty, or some important governmental 
function,”94 such as terrorism or espionage, to assert jurisdiction using the 
protective theory.95  The universal theory grants jurisdiction to any forum 
when the offenses are particularly heinous,96 such as “torture, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”97 
Courts disagree, however, on how influential these theories are, or should 
be, in analyzing jurisdiction in a particular case.98  Theories of international 
law may be able to confer jurisdiction in certain cases where there would not 
ordinarily be clear adjudicative or prescriptive jurisdiction.99  Some may 
argue that international law principles could establish jurisdiction.  However, 
courts do not agree on how persuasive these theories are in asserting 
jurisdiction over an individual. 
II.  NO COURT HAS FULLY ANALYZED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
MDLEA REQUIRES A CONSPIRATOR TO BE ON BOARD A VESSEL 
Unfortunately, courts have only addressed these constitutional concerns in 
passing.100  Part II.A outlines the analysis in United States v. Carvajal,101 the 
 
Framework for Jurisdiction:  Beyond the Harvard Draft, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 69, 69 
(2015) (asserting that the Harvard Draft structure “has represented public international law’s 
approach to jurisdiction” since 1935). 
 92. Fritch, supra note 7, at 713.  
 93. Blakesley, supra note 91, at 1111; Michael P. Scharf, Jurisdiction with Respect to 
Crime:  Universal Jurisdiction and the Harvard Research, in THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL, supra note 91, at 275, 276 
n.5. 
 94. Blakesley, supra note 91, at 1111. 
 95. Scharf, supra note 93, at 276 n.5. 
 96. See id. at 276; see also Blakesley, supra note 91, at 1111. 
 97. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting 
that certain crimes and principles of international law limit universal jurisdiction).  
 98. Fritch, supra note 7, at 713 & n.76 (comparing United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 
1149 (9th Cir. 2006), which states that international law principles could be a “rough guide” 
to determining the appropriate due process “framework,” id. at 1162, with United States v. 
Cardales, 168 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1999), which states that principles of international law 
“determin[e] whether due process is satisfied,” id. at 553). 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(considering whether the theory of universal jurisdiction could confer jurisdiction when the 
vessel was seized in the territorial waters of another nation). 
 100. The court in Carvajal asserted that it was “aware of at least two other cases in which 
conspirators not on board a vessel were convicted of violating MDLEA.” United States v. 
Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 244 (D.D.C. 2013).  However, neither of these cases dealt with 
a foreign national located in a foreign nation, where it was clear that the defendants were not 
trafficking drugs into the United States. See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.  The 
one case cited in Carvajal that dealt with a foreign national in a foreign nation did not employ 
statutory interpretation but ruled that “the object of the charged conspiracy . . . is expressly 
proscribed by the MDLEA.” United States v. Salcedo-Ibarra, No. 8:07-CR-49-T-27TGW, 
2009 WL 1953399, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2009).  
 101. 924 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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only case to have substantially discussed this issue.  Part II.B describes the 
shortcomings in the court’s analysis to illustrate the lack of consideration 
courts have given this issue. 
A.  The Court’s Analysis in Carvajal 
In Carvajal, the D.C. district court considered whether a conspirator must 
be “on board” to be prosecuted under MDLEA.102  The court’s reasoning 
relied on three distinct factors:  (1) a declaration that the conspiracy provision 
could not be read to reach only individuals on board, (2) two district court 
cases, and (3) an understanding that Congress intended to close such 
jurisdictional loopholes.103  The court stated that reading the statute to only 
reach conspirators on board was “novel” and “clever.”104  After outlining the 
defendants’ and government’s arguments, the court held that “[a] conspiracy 
under 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b) . . . must naturally include activities other than 
those that occur directly on board the vessel.  The statute cannot be read any 
other way.”105 
The court relied on two cases to support its analysis.  First, the court cited 
United States v. Salcedo-Ibarra106 and noted that it rejected the argument that 
a conspirator needs to be “on board” a vessel.107  Second, it cited to United 
States v. Medjuck,108 which considered “primarily” due process concerns but 
“relied on the premise that MDLEA applies to conspirators not on board the 
vessel.”109 
The Carvajal court asserted that reading the statute to exclude conspirators 
not on board would be “contrary to Congress’s intent.”110  The court quoted 
the Department of Justice’s argument that Congress’s concern was the “use 
of vessels to transport drugs,” so conspiring to traffic drugs on “a vessel 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . brings [the conspirators] 
under the purview of . . . MDLEA’s conspiracy provision.”111  The court 
acknowledged that other courts have recognized the wide scope of 
MDLEA.112  The court also noted that the defendants were attempting to use 
 
 102. Id. at 243–45. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 243.  
 105. Id. at 244.  
 106. No. 8:07-CR-49-T-27TGW, 2009 WL 1953399 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2009). 
 107. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 244 (“Just as one who possesses cocaine with the intent 
to distribute while ‘on board’ a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States violates 
MDLEA, one who conspires with those ‘on board’ the vessel likewise violates the MDLEA.” 
(quoting Salcedo-Ibarra, 2009 WL 1953399, at *1)).  
 108. 937 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 109. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 244 (citing Medjuck, 937 F. Supp. at 1369–70, 1375). 
 110. Id. at 245.  
 111. Id. (quoting Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
the Indictment at 8, Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219 (No. 106-02)).  
 112. Id. (“MDLEA was passed ‘to strengthen the United States’ drug laws . . . specifically 
by removing geographical barriers [that] had impeded efforts to combat the drug trade.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 
2003))). 
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a “loophole that defendants have unsuccessfully attempted to exploit 
regarding similar statutes for almost 200 years.”113 
Lastly, the Carvajal court held that the Felonies Clause extends to 
conspiracies, asserted jurisdiction, and ruled that this was within Congress’s 
authority by applying U.S. conspiracy law.114 
Because the conspiracy provision must naturally include individuals not 
on board, the court in Carvajal relied on two other cases that also prosecuted 
individuals not on board and on Congress’s intent to close jurisdictional 
loopholes to find that an individual does not need to be “on board” to be 
prosecuted under MDLEA. 
B.  Carvajal Missed the Boat 
In Carvajal, the D.C. district court concluded that an individual does not 
need to be “on board” to be prosecuted as a conspirator,115 but its analysis 
was flawed for four reasons:  (1) it relied on U.S. conspiracy law to establish 
jurisdiction, (2) it did not engage in statutory interpretation to understand the 
scope of MDLEA, (3) it relied on cases that are factually distinct from the 
application at issue that also did not engage in statutory interpretation, and 
(4) it overgeneralized Congress’s intent. 
First, the court applied U.S. conspiracy law in its analysis to establish that 
this was within the scope of Congress’s authority under the Felonies 
Clause.116  This is problematic because there is a circuit split on whether it is 
appropriate to use conspiracy law to establish jurisdiction.117 
Second, the court asserted that no support exists for a reading of the 
conspiracy provision to encompass only those on board a vessel.118  The court 
stated that the conspiracy clause “must naturally include activities other than 
those that occur directly on board the vessel.”119  This assertion ignores three 
important things.  First, historically, the only way for the United States to 
prosecute drug trafficking on the high seas was to prove a conspiracy among 
those on board.120  Second, a conference report to the 1980 Act considers 
how the conspiracy provision reaches someone on board a vessel and does 
not contemplate reaching a land-based conspirator.121  Third, a crew member 
on board a vessel can be prosecuted as a conspirator under MDLEA.122  
 
 113. Id. (citing United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 417 (1820)).  
 114. Id. at 259–60. 
 115. See id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. See Jack Figura, No Consensus on Conspiracy Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 
LAW360 (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1007340 [https://perma.cc/375C-
EFZG]. 
 118. Id. at 244. (“A conspiracy under 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b) . . . must naturally include 
activities other than those that occur directly on board the vessel.  The statute cannot be read 
any other way.”).  
 119. Id.  
 120. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 121. Supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 122. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (prosecuting individuals 
who were aboard the vessel under the conspiracy provision); United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 
334 F.3d 819, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2003) (charging individuals on board a vessel with possession 
2980 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
These three points make clear that the conspiracy provision can be read only 
to criminalize conduct occurring “on board” a vessel on the high seas. 
Third, the analysis in Carvajal relied on cases factually distinguishable 
from reaching a foreign national in a foreign country that did not engage in 
statutory interpretation of MDLEA’s conspiracy provision.  The court based 
part of its analysis on a finding in Medjuck that the conspirator provision 
applies to individuals not on board.123  In Medjuck, however, the individuals 
who were prosecuted as conspirators while not on board the vessel were 
either U.S. citizens or currently located in the territory of the United States.124  
Carvajal also cited Salcedo-Ibarra, but that case rested on nexus and the fact 
that at least some of the cocaine on board was destined for the United 
States.125  Additionally, neither the court in Salcedo-Ibarra nor Medjuck 
conducted statutory interpretation in analyzing the conspiracy provision,126 
which weakens the persuasive authority of the cases in holding that MDLEA 
prosecutes conspirators not on board. 
Fourth, the Carvajal court did not cite any authority showing Congress 
intended for MDLEA to apply to foreign nationals in a foreign nation.  While 
the “use of vessels” may be central to MDLEA, this does not mean that 
Congress intended the statute to reach an individual not on board.  Further, 
just because MDLEA is expansive does not support an expansive 
interpretation of the statute.  Lastly, a general concern about defendants using 
jurisdictional defenses does not indicate that Congress intended to reach all 
persons in all situations. 
Carvajal did not adequately consider whether MDLEA reaches a foreign 
national as a conspirator in a foreign nation, nor did it consider whether this 
application of MDLEA is within Congress’s constitutional authority.  The 
court did not engage in statutory interpretation.  Instead, it relied on cases 
that did not engage in a complete analysis of this question and improperly 
generalized the intent of Congress.  These shortcomings show the lack of 
consideration that courts have given to determining whether the conspiracy 
provision applies to individuals not “on board” the vessel. 
III.  THERE IS NO PRESCRIPTIVE OR ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION TO 
PROSECUTE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT ON THE HIGH SEAS 
If the D.C. district court had done a proper analysis, it should have held 
that reaching a foreign national in a foreign nation as a conspirator to drug 
trafficking is unconstitutional.  Part III of this Note lays out the analysis the 
 
with intent to distribute and conspiracy); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 
1255–56 (9th Cir. 1998) (prosecuting Klimavicius and Lerma-Lerma, who were on board the 
vessel, as conspirators); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1053 (3d Cir. 
1993) (charging Martinez with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy).  
 123. See Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 244–45. 
 124. See id. (discussing that one conspirator was an American in Singapore and that the 
second was a Canadian who was in charge of receiving and distributing the drugs in the United 
States).  
 125. United States v. Salcedo-Ibarra, No. 8:07-CR-49-T-27TGW, 2009 WL 1953399, at 
*2 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2009). 
 126. Id. at *1.  See generally United States v. Medjuck, 937 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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court should have conducted by addressing all the concerns raised in the 
foregoing discussions.127  First, Part III.A argues that Congress’s power is 
limited to reaching crimes and individuals on the high seas under the Define 
and Punish Clause.  With this foundation, Part III.B argues that all provisions 
of MDLEA should be read as limited by the jurisdictional language of “on 
board” a vessel.  Part III.C then briefly considers but rejects the possibility 
that theories of international law could confer jurisdiction. 
A.  Congress Does Not Have the Authority Under the Felonies Clause 
to Enact a Statute That Prosecutes an Individual 
Who Is on Land and Not on the High Seas 
Determining whether prescriptive jurisdiction exists in this context 
depends on whether Congress has the power under the Define and Punish 
Clause to enact a law that prosecutes a foreign national in a foreign nation 
not on the high seas.  Here, the structure of the Constitution, history, and case 
law suggest that Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause does not validly 
reach individuals in foreign nations not on the high seas. 
Congress has the power to punish felonies on the high seas under the 
Define and Punish Clause.128  MDLEA prohibits drug trafficking but only 
prosecutes individuals for this felony129 when committed on a boat130 on the 
high seas.131  Furthermore, no court has held MDLEA to be an abuse of 
congressional authority when there is a nexus to the United States.132  The 
Define and Punish Clause hinges on where the crime occurred, not on the 
location of the individual.133  However, the Define and Punish Clause has 
always been interpreted to reserve the prosecution of crimes committed on 
land to the territory where such conduct occurred.134  Here, the question is 
whether conspiracy can effectively extend an individual’s conduct from land 
to the high seas. 
Within MDLEA, jurisdiction is an initial inquiry “totally distinct from the 
crime itself,” and jurisdiction must be established before U.S. complicity law 
can apply.135  While a conspirator can be prosecuted under U.S. federal law 
 
 127. This Note considers both text- and intention-based arguments but does not address 
which is the correct approach to interpreting the Clause or the statute.  This Note considers 
only the factual situation of a foreign national located in a foreign nation as a conspirator to 
drug trafficking on the high seas. 
 128. See supra Part I.A. 
 129. See Federal Trafficking Penalties, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 
https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ftp3.shtml [https://perma.cc/V446-HNWN] (last visited Apr. 
13, 2018). 
 130. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
 131. See supra Part I.A.  
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that if the vessel is not stateless, the government must prove a sufficient nexus on remand); 
United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49, 251 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding MDLEA 
constitutional as applied to Davis because there was a nexus to the United States). 
 133. See supra Part I.A.  
 134. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 135. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1168–69 (asserting that the court had to establish jurisdiction 
before “apply[ing] United States aiding-and-abetting law” in an MDLEA case).  Conspiracy, 
2982 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
in any venue where any coconspirator acts,136 a court cannot use U.S. 
conspiracy law until it establishes jurisdiction.137  Thus, under MDLEA, the 
individual’s conspiracy cannot be extended to conduct occurring on the high 
seas until the court establishes jurisdiction, which would allow for U.S. 
federal criminal conspiracy law to apply.  Therefore, an argument that the 
scope of Congress’s authority allows for prescriptive jurisdiction over this 
individual would be circular. 
Because the Felonies Clause does not implicate conduct occurring on land 
and is limited to conduct on the high seas, reaching a foreign national located 
in a foreign nation as a conspirator is outside the scope of the Felonies 
Clause.138  Even if implemented using the Necessary and Proper Clause, this 
application of MDLEA would still not be within the scope of Congress’s 
enumerated powers.139  Prosecuting a land-based conspirator is not necessary 
to seizing drugs being transported on the high seas.140 
Therefore, using MDLEA to reach a foreign national located in a foreign 
country not on board a vessel on the high seas exceeds Congress’s power 
under the Felonies Clause.  Thus, prescriptive jurisdiction does not exist to 
prosecute a foreign national as a conspirator in a foreign nation when that 
individual is not on the high seas. 
B.  The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act Does Not Cover 
a Conspirator Who Is in a Foreign Nation 
To find adjudicative jurisdiction, the substantive offense of MDLEA must 
reach a foreign national in a foreign nation as a conspirator.  Here, the text as 
well as the intent and purpose of MDLEA do not render such a reading.  
Further, in light of understanding the Felonies Clause of the Define and 
Punish Clause to not reach such individuals,141 the statute should be read 
within the bounds of Congress’s authority to enact laws.  Applying MDLEA 
to reach a foreign national not “on board” a vessel would be an 
unconstitutional reading of MDLEA due to the limits of Congress’s 
 
a subset of complicity law, is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime 
and such agreement is a crime in itself. Conspiracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014).  
 136. Under U.S. federal criminal law, an individual is liable for all acts of coconspirators 
that are within the scope of agreement. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).  
Jurisdiction is proper in any venue where a coconspirator acts to further the conspiracy 
according to U.S. federal law. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right to trial ‘by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.’  The leverage of 
a conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution and reduces its protection to a 
phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been committed in any district 
where any one of the conspirators did any one of the acts, however innocent, intended to 
accomplish its object.”).  
 137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.  
 138. See supra notes 28, 38 and accompanying text.  
 139. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.  
 140. See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (describing how MDLEA is effective 
at seizing drugs on the high seas and explaining that these individuals would be prosecuted by 
the country of which they are nationals or residents).  
 141. See supra Part III.A. 
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prescriptive jurisdiction.  In addition to there being no adjudicative 
jurisdiction to punish these individuals, this application also presents a due 
process notice problem as a consequence of judicial interpretations and 
applications of the statute.  This Part analyzes MDLEA using various canons 
of statutory interpretation and demonstrates how each of them point to the 
same conclusion, namely, that MDLEA does not extend to foreign 
conspirators who are not physically on board a vessel on the high seas. 
According to the theory of new textualism and the plain meaning rule, 
statutes should be read in accordance with their ordinary meaning when the 
text is clear.142  One may argue that because MDLEA prohibits 
conspiracy,143 it must be read to reach any conspirator of drug trafficking 
conduct.  However, the phrase “on board” a vessel limits the scope of 
MDLEA.144  MDLEA does not prohibit an individual from “intentionally 
manufactur[ing] or distribut[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to manufacture 
or distribute, a controlled substance on board a covered vessel.”  Rather, it 
prohibits individuals “while on board a covered vessel” from knowing or 
intending to manufacture or distribute drugs.145  Therefore, according to the 
statute’s plain meaning, reaching someone not “on board” is not covered and, 
therefore, unreasonable. 
An argument appealing to the meaningful variation canon of statutory 
interpretation146 also fails.  One may claim that, when writing the statute, 
legislators could have included the language of “while on board a covered 
vessel” in the provision regarding conspiracies and attempted crimes if 
legislators intended to reach only those conspiring on the high seas.  
However, under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon, words 
omitted may be just as significant as those words that are set forth.147  Here, 
if the legislators intended the statute to reach conspirators on land, they could 
have provided text for this application.  Further, there is evidence that 
legislators included such a qualifier in prior laws as seen when the First 
Congress enacted a law against piracy148 and prohibited persons “either upon 
the land or the sea” from aiding and abetting such crimes.149 
Under the whole act canon, an appropriate means for understanding the 
text itself considers the act as a whole.150  Here, the title, “Maritime Drug 
 
 142. See generally United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the 
plain meaning rule).  
 143. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 144. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a) (2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (discussing the 
canons against surplusage and redundancy).  
 147. Espressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
 148. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (1790). 
 149. See id. ch. 9, at 114.  This provision did not mandate extraterritorial application. Id.  
If applied to a foreign national in a foreign nation this provision would not create constitutional 
concerns because piracy is considered an offense against the law of nations and is therefore an 
appropriate application of universal jurisdiction. See supra notes 35, 96 and accompanying 
text.  
 150. See generally Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (analyzing the title and 
structure of the act).  
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Law Enforcement Act,” specifically relates to the sea and conduct on the sea.  
The connection to the ocean is significant, especially because Congress’s 
powers under the Felonies Clause are limited to conduct on the high seas.151  
Further, although the Act prohibits conspiracy,152 this provision should be 
read consistently with the rest of the statute and, therefore, should only reach 
conspirators “on board” a vessel. 
According to the legal process theory, the purpose and spirit of the statute 
should be considered when understanding the text.153  One of the major 
reasons MDLEA was seen as necessary was because of defendants making 
arguments regarding jurisdiction.154  One could maintain that legislators 
expressly included conspiracy as a section of the statute to prevent defendants 
from raising such arguments.  However, nothing suggests that jurisdictional 
questions regarding foreign nationals who were not on board concerned 
legislators.  The 1980 Act was seen as necessary to close a loophole for 
individuals who were on board a vessel where the government could not 
prove a drug trafficking conspiracy or could not discover such vessels once 
they had entered U.S. territorial waters.155  Further, even the discussion of 
the conspiracy provision of the 1980 Act only contemplated reaching a 
conspirator on the high seas.156 
Silence on this issue weighs in favor of this reach not being contemplated 
rather than it being conceded to.  One may argue that, according to the “dog 
[that] did not bark” canon,157 if there were concerns about this reach, 
legislators would have argued about them.  Furthermore, one could also argue 
that, because MDLEA received support from both sides of the aisle158 and 
was quickly enacted,159 there were no concerns about the scope of the Act.  
However, legislatures do not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”160  Reaching 
all foreign nationals in foreign countries is an elephant.161  Here, it is unlikely 
that legislators could have contemplated such a profound change of scope 
from the 1980 Act to MDLEA without anybody mentioning it.162 
 
 151. See supra Part I.A.  
 152. Supra note 64.  
 153. See generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) 
(looking to the purpose of the statute). 
 154. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 155. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 157. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 589 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 159. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 160. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 161. See United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Punishing crimes 
committed on foreign soil . . . is an intrusion into the sovereign territory of another nation.”).  
 162. See, e.g., Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 955–57 (9th Cir. 
1981) (analyzing the few times a broad change was mentioned or documented); supra note 74 
and accompanying text (contemplating that the conspiracy provision of the 1980 Act reached 
a person on board a vessel on the high seas); supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text 
(describing how the discussions of MDLEA revolved around budget allocation); supra notes 
84–86 and accompanying text (showing that the majority of language from the 1980 Act was 
used in MDLEA).  
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Within debates regarding the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, there is little 
discussion of MDLEA.  Discussions emphasized the national context of drug 
abuse education163 rather than MDLEA and its potential reach.  The 
presidential signing statement does not even mention MDLEA.164  Therefore, 
it is unlikely that MDLEA was the primary motivation behind the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act. 
Due to this narrow application,165 only a weak argument for congressional 
acquiescence exists.  One may claim that, because Congress has not amended 
the statute to make clear that “on board” limits the conspiracy provision, 
Congress has acquiesced to courts reading the statute in this way.  But, as this 
is a rarely litigated, narrow issue166 and because MDLEA is so highly 
litigated,167 legislators may not even be aware of this application. 
While not directly related to the issue of reaching a conspirator on land, 
the 1996 amendment weighs in favor of understanding “on board” a vessel 
as a limit to the substantive offense of MDLEA.  The 1996 amendment has 
been understood by the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits to clarify that 
language of “on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 
as “a congressionally imposed limit on courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.”168 
Policy arguments also support limiting MDLEA not to reach foreign 
nationals who are not on board a vessel but rather in a foreign nation.  
According to the rule of lenity, criminal statutes should be construed 
narrowly,169 and any ambiguity should be read in favor of the defendant.170  
Although this Note argues that the statute only reaches individuals “on 
board” vessels, there is an ambiguity in the statute because some judges have 
interpreted the statute differently.171  Therefore, MDLEA should be read in 
favor of the defendant and should not be understood to reach a foreign 
national as a conspirator located in a foreign country. 
Because this application would exceed Congress’s Article I powers under 
the Felonies Clause,172 it would be appropriate to construe the statute to avoid 
such a problem.173  Reaching a foreign national located in a foreign nation as 
a conspirator would be outside the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, but 
limiting MDLEA to reach only conspirators “on board” the vessel would 
 
 163. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
 164. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 165. See United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 244 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting the 
court’s awareness of two other cases with this application). 
 166. Id. at 225. 
 167. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 168. See United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); supra note 
88 and accompanying text.  
 169. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).  
 170. Id. at 148 (asserting that the rule of lenity is the presumption when the text is 
ambiguous and that a defendant should prevail when the text is unclear).  
 171. See generally Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219; United States v. Medjuck, 937 F. Supp. 
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 172. See supra Part III.A. 
 173. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 
2012).  
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avoid this constitutional issue.  The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statute is consistent with this reading.174  Further, this interpretation remains 
consistent with other federal laws to read a jurisdictional requirement in a 
federal statute to avoid constitutional concern.175 
The conspiracy provision should not extend the subject matter jurisdiction 
beyond those “on board.”  In United States v. Yakou,176 the court determined 
that a foreign national in a foreign nation could not aid and abet his son’s 
violation of the Brokering Amendment, even where the statute applied 
extraterritorially.177  The court explained that “the crime of aiding and 
abetting ‘confer[s] extraterritorial jurisdiction to the same extent as the 
offense [] that underlie[s it].’”178  Just as the Brokering Amendment applies 
extraterritorially when a “U.S. person” aids and abets a crime,179 MDLEA’s 
conspiracy provision should also apply extraterritorially when an individual 
is “on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 
Nexus to the United States does not resolve all requirements under the 
Constitution.  Some could argue that a nexus to the United States fulfills due 
process to reach foreign vessels or other nations’ waters180 and would fulfill 
due process sufficiently for a foreign national in a foreign nation.  However, 
reaching someone not “on board” appears unreasonable, and those 
individuals would not have notice of this application because prosecuting a 
foreign conspirator has occurred only rarely.181  Although there may be a 
nexus to the United States, there exist different constitutional concerns such 
as the substantive offense not covering such conduct and the statute being 
interpreted in a way that would not make individuals aware that MDLEA 
reaches their conduct.182 
The substantive offense does not prosecute a foreign national in a foreign 
nation as a conspirator.  Adjudicative jurisdiction does not exist to prosecute 
 
 174. To have adjudicative jurisdiction over an individual, the government must prove that 
the defendant was “on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” United 
States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008).  This case did not consider the 
question of reaching a coconspirator not on board but rather an individual on a “go-fast” vessel. 
Id. at 1268.  The Fifth and D.C. Circuits agree that “whether a vessel is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States” is a limit on the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. See supra 
note 88 and accompanying text.  
 175. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (discussing the 
mailing element in federal mail fraud); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 & n.9 (1975) 
(discussing “federal officer” as a jurisdictional element that allows for federal jurisdiction).  
Further, the First Circuit’s interpretation of MDLEA supports this interpretation. See United 
States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that “jurisdiction” in 
§ 1903(f) refers to the substantive reach of the statute and that Congress’s use of the term 
“authority to regulate” is analogous to its use of “affects interstate commerce” or “involved a 
federally insured bank”). 
 176. 428 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
 177. Id. at 251–54. 
 178. Id. at 252 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
 179. Id. at 252–53. 
 180. See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1256–59 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 181. See United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 243–45 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting just 
two other cases where a land-based conspirator was prosecuted).  
 182. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
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these individuals.  Therefore, it is unconstitutional to use MDLEA in this 
way.  In addition to there being no adjudicative jurisdiction, the way MDLEA 
has been interpreted and applied to reach individuals’ conduct produces a due 
process notice problem for these individuals. 
C.  Theories Alone Cannot Establish Jurisdiction 
One might argue that principles of international law could establish 
jurisdiction.183  However, unless a federal statute expressly prohibits 
conduct, the federal judiciary does not have jurisdiction over the individual 
that engaged in that conduct.184  Therefore, if MDLEA does not cover the 
conduct of a coconspirator not on board a vessel on the high seas, other 
theories should not be able to establish a basis for prosecuting the 
coconspirator.  Even if these theories could establish jurisdiction, they fail to 
do so in this instance. 
Both the protective principle and universal theories of jurisdiction have 
been rejected by courts as a basis for MDLEA.185  While one may argue that 
the United States has a national interest in the effects of drug trafficking, such 
effects do not rise to the level of threatening national security or an important 
government function.  Thus, using the protective principle to establish 
jurisdiction would be erroneous here.186  Likewise, drug trafficking is neither 
heinous nor similar to the crimes of torture and genocide.  Using universal 
jurisdiction in this instance would also be incorrect.187  Therefore, neither of 
these theories could establish jurisdiction for the crime of drug trafficking. 
According to the Charming Betsy doctrine, statutes should be read to 
comply with international law.188  While every country prosecutes drug 
trafficking as “criminal behavior,” drug trafficking is neither an 
“international crime” nor universally cognizable.189  Therefore, theories of 
universal jurisdiction do not extend to drug crimes.190  Further, Justice Breyer 
has cautioned reading the protective principle broadly to ensure that the 
government does not use this theory to prosecute any vital interest.191 
It follows that principles of international law cannot establish U.S. 
jurisdiction over a foreign national in a foreign country for being a 
conspirator to drug trafficking on the high seas. 
 
 183. See Fritch, supra note 7, at 713–14.  Fritch argues that the United States can establish 
jurisdiction, absent a nexus to the United States, using international legal theories and treaties. 
Id. at 721.  
 184. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).  
 185. Fritch, supra note 7, at 715.   
 186. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.  
 187. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 188. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  
 189. Kontorovich, supra note 7, at 1226.  See generally United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1582 U.N.T.S. 95(1988).   
 190. See Kontorovich, supra note 7, at 1223–27 (asserting that universal jurisdiction cannot 
be an international law basis for MDLEA). 
 191. United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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IV.  UNDERSTANDING “ON BOARD” A VESSEL AS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHECK ON MDLEA 
In addition to there being no prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, 
policy arguments and practical implications also weigh in favor of declining 
to extend MDLEA to foreign nationals acting as conspirators located in a 
foreign nation.  Part IV.A shows that the United States can refrain from 
establishing jurisdiction because other remedies exist.  Next, Part IV.B 
recommends that courts stop prosecuting foreign nationals in foreign nations 
as conspirators and suggests that legislators amend the statute.  Part IV.B 
adds that, in the event legislators want MDLEA to reach individuals who are 
foreign conspirators, and if the Supreme Court approves of this reach, 
Congress should amend the conspiracy provision to include “on land or on 
sea.” 
A.  Walking the Plank:  Practical Considerations Show Conspirators Will 
Be Prosecuted in the Absence of MDLEA 
While there may be arguments that foreign conspirators located in foreign 
nations should not be out of reach of the U.S. criminal law, real-world 
considerations show that these individuals will be prosecuted even if the 
United States declines to extend jurisdiction.  Drug crimes are criminalized 
universally;192 therefore, other remedies exist besides MDLEA.  The foreign 
nation wherein the conspirators are located, or the foreign nation of which 
they are citizens, should prosecute these individuals, and the United States 
could provide any assistance necessary in the investigation.193  Therefore, it 
is unnecessary for the United States to pursue these prosecutions. 
Policy considerations also weigh against the United States prosecuting 
foreign nationals not on board vessels on the high seas.  Clear connections 
exist between the War on Drugs and mass incarceration.194  Incarceration 
rates in the United States were consistent from 1925 until 1975; however, 
since then, incarceration rates have increased fourfold.195  In 1980, “drug 
offenders” accounted for 25 percent “of the federal prison population”; by 
1996, they accounted for 59 percent.196  Mass incarceration is problematic 
 
 192. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.  
 193. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, supra note 189, at 170–81.  The Convention mandates that each 
signatory “shall adopt such measures as may be necessary” to criminalize a variety of drug-
related offenses. Id. at 175–76.  This includes “tak[ing] such measures as may be necessary to 
establish jurisdiction.” Id.  When “[an] offence has been committed” by the national of a 
signatory country or one present in its territory, the “[p]arties shall afford one another . . . the 
widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial 
proceedings.” Id. at 181–82. 
 194. Benjamin Levin, Note, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2188 (2016). 
 195. David Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 241, 
250 (2001).  The United States has the highest per capita rate of incarceration, which is five 
times higher than the next western European country. Id. 
 196. Id. (arguing that the War on Drugs been an influential factor in the “explosion in 
incarceration rates” in the United States).  
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because it is costly and, from a social welfare perspective, raises concerns 
about quality of life and reentry problems.197 
Additionally, incarceration does not solve the drug abuse problem.198  That 
the War on Drugs targets minorities erodes the scheme’s validity.199  United 
States taxpayers should not pay to prosecute and imprison another nation’s 
drug criminals when incarceration clearly does not solve the drug problem, 
and targeting minorities will only undermine the legitimacy of the War on 
Drugs. 
MDLEA effectively curbs international drug trafficking without reaching 
a foreign national located in a foreign country as a conspirator.  One may try 
to assert that, because MDLEA ineffectively targets drug trafficking if it 
cannot reach a conspirator not “on board” the vessel, such an application is 
necessary and proper to execute Congress’s powers to punish felonies on the 
high seas.  However, MDLEA still allows the Coast Guard to seize massive 
amounts of drugs headed to the United States.200  Further, the inability to 
reach a conspirator located in a foreign nation would not truncate Congress’s 
authority to police the ocean for drugs headed to the United States.  Lastly, 
because of international agreement that countries will prosecute drug 
trafficking, individuals located in foreign nations should be prosecuted for 
violating their own nations’ drug laws.201  Therefore, an argument that the 
conspirator will continue to conspire to traffic drugs remains unfounded 
because the individual will be imprisoned whether in the United States or in 
his or her own nation.202 
It is important to keep in mind that “[h]ow we treat foreign nationals . . . 
ultimately tests our own humanity.”203  Out of respect for other countries, 
U.S. courts should consider whether jurisdiction is appropriate over a 
noncitizen.204  Beyond that, it is in the United States’ best interest to treat 
 
 197. For a discussion of the problems of mass incarceration, see generally MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010). 
 198. Cole, supra note 195, at 253 (“[W]e cannot ‘incarcerate ourselves out of’ the drug 
problem.” (quoting Mireya Navarro, Experimental Courts Are Using New Strategies to Blunt 
the Lure of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/ 
17/us/experimental-courts-are-using-new-strategies-to-blunt-the-lure-of-drugs.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5E5-C5KH])).  
 199. Id. at 252–53 (“Two features of the war on drugs in particular corrode legitimacy.  The 
first is the reality and perception that the system is unfair to minorities, subjecting them to 
much harsher treatment than whites.”).  
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (seizing 
approximately 2000 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608, 611 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (seizing 21,000 pounds of marijuana); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247 
(9th Cir. 1990) (seizing 7000 pounds of marijuana).  
 201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
 202. See supra note 193. 
 203. Cole, supra note 53, at 388.  
 204. Chaissan, supra note 8, at 655–56.  Prosecuting a foreign national in a foreign nation 
as a conspirator for drug trafficking to a foreign nation is inconsistent with Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States’s understanding of when prosecuting an 
individual is reasonable.  The Restatement asserts that jurisdiction is reasonable if the person 
is present in, domiciled in, a resident of, or a national of the state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  Jurisdiction 
is unreasonable if the person is only transitorily in the state. See id.  Further, the Restatement 
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foreign nationals the way that the United States would hope foreign nations 
would treat U.S. citizens.  Because nations possess analogous powers to those 
granted under the Define and Punish Clause,205 in this context, U.S. courts 
should consider the ability of a foreign nation to extradite a U.S. citizen and 
prosecute that individual pursuant to the foreign nation’s laws.  As this would 
make many wary, courts should consider limiting the U.S. government from 
doing this to other nation’s citizens.  If not, other nations may attempt to do 
the same to U.S. citizens. 
B.  All Aboard:  Recommendation to Courts and Legislators That MDLEA 
Should Prosecute Only Individuals “on Board” 
As discussed above, using MDLEA to reach a foreign national located in 
a foreign nation as a conspirator is unconstitutional, and the statute should be 
read to avoid this reach.  Courts should read MDLEA to limit prosecution to 
only individuals on the high seas, U.S. citizens, or persons in U.S. territories. 
The scope of the Felonies Clause and the text of the statute does not reach 
a foreign national in a foreign nation as a conspirator.206  An argument that 
this reach is within Congress’s authority is circular and illogical.207  Policy 
and practical considerations weigh against reaching a foreign national located 
in a foreign nation as a conspirator to drug crimes aboard vessels on the high 
seas.208  For the foregoing reasons, the statute should be read with 
jurisdictional language that limits an application to individuals “on board” 
vessels on the high seas. 
This Note recommends a remedy in two steps.  First, courts should 
immediately stop applying the law to reach foreign nationals located in a 
foreign nation as conspirators.  Courts should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of MDLEA as requiring the government to show an individual 
was “on board a vessel subject to jurisdiction of the United States” to 
establish jurisdiction.209  Second, legislators should amend the statute to 
clarify that, while the Act covers conspirators, it does not cover conduct or 
individuals who are not “on board” a vessel.  Legislators may want to include 
the language of “on board” a vessel in the conspiracy provision to make this 
expressly clear.  Showing that legislators do not acquiesce to the Carvajal 
interpretation of MDLEA requires this amendment. 
If this application does not stop, the constitutional issue should be certified 
to the Supreme Court to determine whether reaching a foreign national in a 
 
considers jurisdiction reasonable when the person has consented to jurisdiction, conducts 
regular business in the state, or has engaged in activity outside the state that will have 
“substantial” effects within the state. Id.  Thus, extending jurisdiction over a foreign national 
who has never been present in, domiciled in, a resident of, a national of, who has neither 
conducted activity in the state, nor engaged in conduct affecting the state (in the case where 
the drugs are not destined for the United States), is inconsistent with the Restatement’s 
understanding of when conferring jurisdiction is reasonable. See id.   
 205. See supra note 35.  
 206. See supra Part III.  
 207. Supra Part I.A.  
 208. Supra Part IV.A. 
 209. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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foreign nation exceeds the scope of Congress’s powers under the Felonies 
Clause.  Due to the Necessary and Proper Clause,210 it is possible that the 
Supreme Court may determine that this application of MDLEA is necessary 
and proper for Congress to execute its power under the Felonies Clause.  If 
the Supreme Court were to hold this way, due to the fact that the substantive 
offense does not reach this conduct, this Note recommends that legislators 
amend the statute to make this application clear.  This Note suggests 
reincorporating language similar to that used by the First Congress and 
include whether “on land or on sea” to the conspiracy provision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act prosecutes individuals for drug 
trafficking “on board” vessels.  The text of MDLEA does not criminalize the 
conduct of an individual not on board, nor did legislators ever contemplate 
this reach.  Courts should interpret all provisions of MDLEA as limited by 
the jurisdictional language of “on board a covered vessel” to avoid 
constitutional concerns.  Legislators should amend the statute to make clear 
the conspiracy provision only applies to individuals who are “on board” 
vessels. 
 
 210. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
